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1. Introduction
There is only one metropolitan area in Hungary which compares to the metropolitan areas in Europe
as a whole. Budapest, and the suburbs having close ties with the capital, have underwent a deep
transformation  since  the  collapse  of  Communism.  Up  until  the  eighties,  people  living  in  the
suburban area longed to move into the city. Living conditions and, consequently, the prestige of the
suburbs were comparatively poor. In the 1990s, Budapest lost 15 percent of its population, while its
suburban area grew by 20 percent.  Many of the  emigrants  out  of  Budapest  moved to  the new
suburban areas, looking for a ‘greener’ environment. At the same time, the suburbs which had been
totally neglected by Communist central planning, quickly improved their infrastructure attracting
wealthier people who increasingly sought new lifestyles. As a result, the suburban areas expanded
and the settlements  developed rapidly. In 1990,  the Local  Government  Act  devolved numerous
competences to  the municipalities  as  well  as providing them with a  constitutionally guaranteed
autonomy  status.  At  the  same  time,  this  act  did  not  establish  any  institution  to  govern  the
metropolitan area and the issue became a bone of contention between the district governments and
the city government. In general, the extensive local autonomy of the former came into conflict with
the city government’s aspirations to coordinate development.
These demographic and administrative changes provide the starting point for this paper. We aim to
set out the current challenges faced by the Budapest metropolitan area. The first section describes
how the area evolved both before and during the Communist system. The second part presents the
main  socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  area  while  in  the  third  part,  we  discuss  the  main
problems of governing an area with strong internal links but lacking any overarching administrative
units.  The rest of the paper focuses on the micro level dimension. The fourth section compares
political patterns within Budapest and the suburban areas, followed by an analysis of some of the
main conflicts caused by the rapid suburbanization process of the 1990s. This part of the papers is
based on original qualitative research carried out by the authors. In the final section we make some
conclusions. As this paper is the first product of a research in progress, these conclusions are only
tentative.
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2. The Budapest Metropolitan Area Before and Under Communism
Budapest was established in 1872 by the unification of three towns: Pest, Buda, and Óbuda ('Old
Buda'). This administrative act resolved most coordination problems until the end of the nineteenth
century.  By the beginning of  the  twentieth  century,  urban development  had created a  circle  of
settlements that were closely connected to Budapest. In the first half of the twentieth century, the
administrative independence of the suburbs as well as the nature of the conservative-authoritarian
regime, which tended to regard Budapest as a potential seat of revolutionary activity, made large-
scale administrative reform impossible.
Reforms  implemented  by  the  Communist  power  in  1950  led  to  the  establishment  of  'Great
Budapest'. These reforms lacked the sophistication of earlier scientific plans, primarily because its
main considerations were political. The 23 settlements annexed to Budapest were selected so that
the  'correct'  mixture  of workers,  peasants  (potential  workers)  and intellectuals  was  reached.  No
feasibility investigation preceded the reforms.
No actual planning for the integration of these newly annexed territories was begun until 1960. The
suburbanization  process,  which  occurred  within  the  city  borders  in  the  1950s,  was  neither
spontaneous nor planned. Individual decisions often determined the development of the city. As a
corollary of forced industrialization, these tended to occur very quickly. The population of Budapest
steadily grew until the 1980s, although between 1956 and 1957 92,000 inhabitants not only left the
city, but also the country as a consequence of the revolution that was crushed by Soviet tanks and
Hungarian Communists.
With regards to the period before 1989/90,  we can confidently state that both qualitatively and
functionally,  suburban  development  was  substantially  different  after  the  change of  the  regime.
During the years of state socialism, the agglomeration processes were determined by the growing
needs for labor in Budapest. The capital was the focus of the state-socialist development of industry1
which generated an enormous demand for labor which was not satisfied by the entry of women into
the  labor  market  nor  by  the  migration  of  workers  into  the  capital.  This  influx  was  a  major
contribution to population growth in the outlying areas and was accompanied by a rapid rise in the
volume of suburb-to-city commuting.
Additional reasons for settling outside the city center city included the administrative difficulties
involved  in  settling  within  the  city  boundaries  and,  secondly,  an  under-financing  of  urban
infrastructure which arose out of the preoccupation with industrial development. This, in turn, led to
long-term housing shortages in Budapest2. As infrastructural development and housing construction
could  not  keep  pace  with  immigration,  after  1962,  the  population  inflow was  administratively
regulated. As a result, a new wave of population growth or, alternatively, population congestion
began in the 1960s in the metropolitan area beyond the city. The peak of population growth in the
Budapest Metropolitan Area was recorded in the 1960s.
This situation was exacerbated by still current land regulations that protect all agricultural areas.
1  In the 1950s, 60% of the industrial output in Hungary was concentrated in Budapest. After the 1950s, this ratio
began to decrease.
2  As a result of this delayed urban development (to use the term employed by Szelényi & Manchin 1972) the number
of industrial city workers grew faster than the number of city dwellers. This contributed greatly to a process which
saw nearby villages and towns swallowed up by the metropolitan area. As a result, while the level of industrialization
was relatively high, large portions of the country’s population resided in rural-type settlements and carried on a dual
existence. At the time of the change of political regime, 40% of the country’s population still resided in villages.
Participation  in  the  “second  economy” (rural  work  as  a  second  job)  made  it  possible  for  village  dwellers  to
accumulate  goods and  invest  in  large-scale  home construction in  villages.  At  the  same time,  the  infrastructure
continued  to  be  underdeveloped,  creating  a  handicap  for  the  local  governments  of  the  post-regime-change
metropolitan area of Budapest.
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Home construction can only take place in the centers of communities around Budapest. Thus, the
labor force catchment area extends along major highway and railway lines as far as 60 to 70 kms
from Budapest and, in some cases, even beyond that.
The growth in the suburban population came about through the migration of a population from
provincial cities, towns and villages to Budapest3. After the 1960s, the expansion of the Budapest
labor market began to slow down, as did the growth of the metropolitan area. During the 1970s and
1980s,  only those areas  where the  state  carried out  home construction  projects  associated with
industrial development (as in Százhalombatta, Szigetszentmiklós, Dunakeszi and Gödöllő) or which
possessed scenic beauty and favorable location (Szentendre, Solymár and Pomáz) witnessed any
significant population growth
One of the main indicators of the expansion of the metropolitan area was the growing number of
commuters,  which  resulted  in  the  creation  of  a  relatively urban  employment  structure  in  these
communities. While at the nationwide level, 20% of active earners commuted to work in 1970 and
25% in 1980, in the Budapest Metropolitan Area, there were some communities (e.g. Gyál, Üröm,
Göd, Isaszeg, Halásztelek, Budakeszi) that in 1970 had 80% of workers commuting to work from
their  place  of  residence.  During this  time,  a  total  of  200,000 commuters  were  recorded in  the
Budapest  Metropolitan  Area  (Beluszky 1999).  At  the  time  of  the  1990 census,  61% of  active
participants in the labor market commuted from suburban communities to the city.
At the same time, infrastructural developments in the outlying areas lagged behind. In this period
not  only  were  such  developments  under-financed,  they  were  also  tied  to  specific  industrial
investments. The ban on industrial development4 in large parts of the metropolitan area contributed
to the emergence of unfavorable  living conditions,  since,  as we have mentioned, state-financed
home construction projects only took place in a very few locations. The Municipal Development
Concept of 1971 offered no special provisions for the problems in the Budapest Metropolitan Area.
As  a  result  of  the  great  influx  of  people  and  attendant  increase  in  demand  for  infrastructural
development, these municipalities were disadvantaged in comparison with other villages.
In  summary,  with  a  few  fortunate  exceptions,  the  suburban  communities  in  the  Budapest
Metropolitan Area were dormitory communities in this period. They were residential areas serving
the labor market needs of the capital and, as such, they lacked many of the features of suburban life,
such as developed infrastructure, suburban landscape, and an urban lifestyle. Quite the contrary,
these communities suffered from congestion and under-urbanization.
3  As we will mention later, the history of suburbanization of Budapest was a gradual process which at this stage took
place largely within city boundaries and only extended beyond them later, in the 1980s and mainly in the 1990s.
4  In 1959, 64 communities in the Budapest Metropolitan Area were included in the ban of industrial development, to
protect the labor market of the capital.
4 of 20 pages
3. The Transformation in the 1990s
Demographic Changes
After the 1980s, the lopsided functional relationship between the suburban communities and the city
began to change, gradually becoming more balanced. During this period, the demand for labor in the
capital  started  to  decrease  and this  continued after  1989.  The  population  total  in  the  Budapest
Metropolitan Area showed no significant increase throughout the 1980s and only started to rise in
the  1990s.  However,  the  recent  population  growth  is  increasingly due  to  suburbanization.  This
decade witnessed the transformation of the urban growth pattern into one that resembled most post-
industrial  societies.  The  true  suburbs  of  the  state  socialist  era  were  formed  within  the  city
boundaries (Szelényi & Ladányi 1997). In other words, suburbanization in the 1960s and 1970s saw
the creation of high-prestige, socially homogeneous communities within Budapest, specifically in
some districts of Buda close to the city center. A little later, suburbanization slowly spread to the
outlying districts,  away from the  city center,  until  it  reached low-density housing areas (family
homes)  on  the  outskirts.  At  that  point,  it  moved  beyond  the  city  boundaries.  Budapest
suburbanization was a gradual process and only in its last phase was there a migration of the middle
class away from the city center.
Compared to Western European countries, the suburbanization process in Hungary can generally be
described as rather belated and one in which the villages played a great part, thereby narrowing the
circle  of  potential  settlers.  Generally speaking,  economic  and residential  suburbanization  in  the
1990s  took  place  at  the  same  time.  It  was  motivated  by the  mass  privatizations  of  apartment
buildings, the winding down of state-financed home construction projects,  the appearance of an
affluent  entrepreneurial  class  and the availability of cheaper real  estate and utility prices  in  the
suburbs.  The  process  was  also  strongly encouraged by a  booming real  estate  market  and local
government policy incentives  for  people  moving out  into  the suburbs.  The process  was further
helped  by the  high  ratio  of  weekend  cottages,  one  part  of  which  at  least  lent  them readily to
suburbanization.
It  is,  however,  important  to  distinguish between two types of  motivations  for  moving into  the
suburbs: the middle class was inspired by the suburban landscape and environment while pensioners
and low-income families moved there for the area’s significantly lower costs of living. The result
was  that  the  Budapest  Metropolitan  Area  experienced  a  spatial  segregation  of  different  social
classes. In conjunction with the business boom, suburban differences became spectacular. In the
mid-1990s,  Iván Szelényi and János Ladányi predicted that  a significant  proportion of the low-
income families moving from the capital would be forced to settle in communities farther away
from the city. According to the authors, in these areas they will form a new “village underclass”
(Szelényi & Ladányi 1997). At the same time, deteriorating inner districts of Budapest will creating
a  “ghettoization”  phenomena  whereby a  higher  concentration  of  underprivileged,  mostly  Roma
people, will fill the space vacated by the middle class. The authors predicted that this inner district
misery will spread. As it turned out, in some case, the development seems to have been effectively
countered, for example, by the rehabilitation projects in the 9th district.
If  we look at  the  figures  behind these  changes,  it  appears  that  in  the  1980s  the  population  of
Budapest was more or less stagnating (the migration balance still being positive) and, after 1993, it
began to decline. In the first three years of the 1990s, the migration balance was still positive, but in
the following years more people left Budapest than moved into it. The volume of people moving out
of  Budapest  continuously  rose.  The  natural  decline  of  the  population  accelerated,  due  to  the
decreasing number of births and the steady but still high number of deaths. In the last 7 to 8 years,
the population decline in Budapest has been significant with an annual rate of decrease of 1%. In
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2000, 10 out of every 1,000 Budapest residents moved into the suburbs in Pest county. The volume
of steady migration into this area underwent a dramatic increase after 1992. The migration balance
of Budapest versus Pest County has been negative since 1988, but after 1994, it became negative in
respect of all other parts of the country as well.  Budapest  residents move most  intensely to the
suburbs bordering on or near the city boundaries.
In  the  Metropolitan  Area  in  1990,  despite  the  natural  decline,  there  was  a  rising  trend  in  the
population. Between 1990 and 2000, the population of the suburbs in the Metropolitan Area grew
by over 100,000, a 19.13% increase. At the same time, Budapest experienced a 12.77% decline in
the  number of residents.  By the time of  the  2001 census,  roughly one-quarter  of the  country’s
population (2,434,603 people) lived within the Budapest Metropolitan Area. 72% of this population
resided in the city, down from the 78% that was recorded in 1990. It is important to keep in mind
that  the  population  growth  of  the  suburbs  is  solely due  to  the  people  settling  there  as  deaths
outweigh births and the natural trend is declining. In other words, the general population decline
that characterizes the entire country is just as observable in the Budapest suburbs, despite the lower
average age there. The most significant population increase took place in Telki, a village on the
Buda side, where the population grew from 629 in 1990 to 1892 in 2001. This tripling was the result
of a Budapest-rooted population. Already in 1995 three of four inhabitants (73.3%) in Telki were
immigrants from Budapest (Daróczi 1999) and in all probability this ratio has since grown.
One important demographic consequence of the migration from Budapest to the suburbs is that the
population within the city center is much older than that of the suburbs. 23 percent of the population
of  Budapest  is  more  than  60  years  old,  while  the  equivalent  ratio  is  only 16,9  percent  in  the
suburban area. The national average is 20 percent.
Compared to 1990, the number of residences in the suburbs grew by 23% by 2001, while the growth
in Budapest was only 3%. With regards to the intensity of home construction, there is a clear North-
vs-South dividing line in the suburbs, with most of the construction work taking place in the areas
north of Budapest. Lately, rising land prices has led to a leveling-off of new house building.
Economic and Infrastructural Changes
The fact that suburban communities managed to shake off their status as dormitory communities of
Budapest  was primarily due to the economic boom. After the change of the political  regime, a
process of homogenization began between Budapest and the suburban areas, the most important
feature of which was the strengthening of the local  economies.  For a  wide array of production
facilities, the suburban areas possess a number of attractive qualities, such as space, ample labor
supply, relatively developed infrastructure, complex labor market, favorable tax conditions, more
affordable real estate, close proximity to Budapest as a market for goods, access to information and
so on. This all means that the former division of labor is undergoing significant changes and the
spatial system of business relations is also being transformed. One of the most significant changes
within the Metropolitan Area is the decreasing centralization of the capital city. 
Looking at the number of business enterprises per 1,000 people, at the end of 2001, there were 95
business enterprises recorded in the suburbs. While this maybe lower than the Budapest average of
138, at the same time it is significantly higher than the national average. These figures attest to an
economic growth that is more dynamic than the national one. The suburbs saw a 250% increase in
the number of business enterprises between 1990 and 1995 and a further 33% expansion between
1996 and 2001. Within this,  the number of companies increased by 89%, while the number of
single-person  businesses  (self-employment)  saw  only  a  modest  increase  of  4%.  What  is  also
noteworthy is that the growth rate in the villages and towns exceeded that of the cities. During this
period in Budapest, growth was less dynamic with an overall increase of 22% while the number of
self-employments actually decreased. By the end of 2001, 36% of all domestic business enterprises
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were registered in the Budapest Metropolitan Area – 79% in Budapest, 21% in the suburbs (Central
Statistical Office 2003).
The economic development of the area is even more conspicuous if one looks at the figures for
business enterprises incorporating foreign capital investment. For every 10,000 residents, Budapest
had 81 such companies  and the suburbs 25.  As much as  60% of  all  domestic  companies  with
foreign stakeholders are registered in this area while 68% of all foreign capital was invested here. In
the Budapest Metropolitan Area, foreign capital was invested in and around the four edge cities of
Gödöllő, Budaőrs, Vác and Dunaharaszti.
As regards the number of business enterprises and the rate of unemployment the Southern Gyál area
is the most disadvantaged while the number of business enterprises is highest in the areas west of
the city (Budaörs and Törökbálint) and in Szentendre, located North of Budapest. 
In the 1990s, there were emerging differences not only between suburban municipalities but also
between the part of Pest County belonging to the Budapest Metropolitan Area and the part which
does not. The number of commuters in these suburban communities not only refused to grow since
1990 but, in fact, a slight decline was recorded. According to the 2001 census the proportion of
commuters out of the economically active population was 59%. Suburbanization is responsible for
the fact that this ratio did not drop by an even greater extent. The smallest decreases were recorded
in communities where the ratio was already rather low in 1990 as well as in those outer suburban
communities that are farthest from Budapest.
Increasing  tax  revenues  facilitated  enormous  infrastructure  developments  in  the  suburban
municipalities.  The  most  dynamic  growth was recorded in  the  case  of  the  natural  gas  pipeline
system. Whereas in 1990, only 36% of all households were connected to the system, by 2001 this
figure grew to 86%. Most of the communities undertook the development of sewer systems. The
number of communities without a sewer system dropped from 46 in 1990 to 29 in 1997 and to 13 in
2001. During the same period, the proportion of households connected in the central city grew from
80 to 89 percent. In 2001, 49% of all households were connected to a sewer system and whereas the
figure may not seem all that impressive, progress is undeniable as in 1990 the corresponding rate
was only 20%. In this respect, villages and towns experienced a significantly higher rate of progress
than cities. The relative underdevelopment of the suburbs under Communism is indicated by the
fact that, already in 1990, 88 percent of households were connected to the main sewage system.
In  the  years  following  the  change  of  the  political  regime,  the  suburbs  became  increasingly
differentiated  both  socially  and  economically.  On  the  one  hand,  we  can  draw  a  dividing  line
between the inner and outer rings of suburbs. On the other, differences are pronounced between
various  sectors  within  the  suburban areas.  Generally speaking we can  posit  that  various  social
statistical indicators demonstrate that the conditions in the outer ring are the least favorable, while
there is also an East vs West divide. For example, the inner sectors on the Buda side have the
highest  ratio  of  people  with  higher  education,  per  capita  personal  income  tax  and  number  of
business enterprises. The southeastern sector of the suburban area displays the most halting process
of urbanization, the lowest ratio of business enterprises and a high ratio of commuting blue-collar
workers. Residents here are still very much involved in agrarian production, earning the region the
description “a working class district in a rural environment.” (Beluszky 1999)
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4. The Governance Challenge
As in other metropolitan areas, governance in Budapest exhibits a tension between administrative
fragmentation on the one hand and socio-economic unity on the other. Successive political regimes
have been unable to respond to this challenge, although it probably would be as accurate to say that
they have not made much attempt to resolve the situation.
There has  never been one administrative unit  that  covered both  Budapest  and its  suburbs.  The
administrative system has never considered the specificities of the municipalities around the city,
treating them in the same way as the rest  of the country. Most  suburbs belong to Pest  County.
Nevertheless, this county has a large, mostly southern part, which does not belong to the suburban
area. Moreover, there are several suburbs that belong to other counties.
The 1971 Law on Councils5 already allowed the establishment of a special administrative unit, the
so-called 'city environs' ('városkörnyék'), but for many years this institution was not used. Only in
1984 did city environs replaced the previous, highly centralized district  system, providing more
opportunities for self-determination to the towns around Budapest.
The 1971 law was followed by Government Decree No. 1005 in 1971, which established the official
Budapest Metropolitan Area. This Area incorporated 44 suburban communities, towns and villages
within its boundaries. The criteria for inclusion in the Budapest Metropolitan Area depended on the
labor force needs of the capital and the existence of easy access from the community to Budapest. In
other words, communities with a high volume of commuter traffic to the capital were included in
the Budapest Metropolitan Area. In practice, the establishment of this Area had no consequence and
the importance of the decree was rather symbolic than practical.
The new general development plan (the so-called 'ÁRT') did have more practical relevance. Not
only did it cover Budapest, it included the suburban municipalities in a single document. This was a
very significant new development, although the suburbs were still treated from the perspective of
the development of Budapest. There were no plans to devolve functions to them, but undoubtedly
the outer districts of Budapest did gain a new impetus. The scheme was prepared from 1980, but
came into force only in 1989.
The 1990 Local Government Act brought about an enormous change. Freely elected, autonomous
local  governments  replaced the  centrally commanded local  units.  The  local  government  system
became one of the main pillars of the new political regime and local governments obtained genuine
rights and competences. The Act contains a separate chapter on Budapest, which received a special
administrative system of its own. The districts of the capital received broad authorities and complete
legal  autonomy.  This  paved  the  way for  the  development  of  the  previously  subordinate  outer
districts, resulting in the emergence of several sub-centers within the city. Despite these advance,
the law did lead to three, as yet unresolved, problems:
1. The 23 district governments and the capital government are legally equal and, in principle, their
competences exist at different levels. However, the law is not entirely clear in this regard which in
the beginning led to many conflicts between the two tiers. Practice, precedence and minor legal
changes have subsequently improved this situation.
2. The central government and the national parties often stir up strife between the liberal-socialist-
led city government and the district governments and between the inner and outer districts. More
importantly,  the  central  government  often  attempts  to  limit  the  financial  autonomy  of  the
municipalities,  creating  tension  between  the  wide  legal  and  narrow  financial  autonomy.  The
underfunding of compulsory services resulted in some community property being sold off. Thus,
municipalities are mortgaging their future.
5  In this case 'Council' means 'Soviet', i.e. the local unit of the Communist party-state.
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The municipalities  of  the  suburban areas  emerge  as  the  losers  in  the  privatization  deals.  With
respect  to  infrastructure,  the  suburban  communities  were  handicapped  from the  start.  As  state
socialism  neglected  to  bring  about  fundamental  developments  in  these  areas,  by  now,  certain
infrastructure developments simply cannot be put off any longer. As the state had no resources for
that, it sold the gas and electricity companies (in practice monopolies!) to foreign investors (often
state-owned  firms  like  the  Gaz  de  France).  Even  though  some  suburban  communities  share
infrastructure  systems  with  the  city  of  Budapest,  neither  they,  nor  the  district  governments  of
Budapest received a share of the revenues from privatizing these systems and had no say in how
privatization was done.
3. The fragmented nature of the Budapest Metropolitan Area is not counter-balanced by any kind of
metropolitan  institution.  Because  the  governmental  structure  in  the  suburban  areas  is  rather
fragmented, so far no solutions have been found to problems such as managing and coordinating
public  services  and  organizing  regional  development  across  municipal  boundaries.  The  capital
government  is  not  really  interested  in  a  metropolitan  government  because  it  would  take
competences away from Budapest, hamper their ability to divert resources in their direction, and
generally weaken their power vis-à-vis the suburbs. On the other hand, the suburbs want to preserve
their independence and are still very conscious of the centralization times when they occupied a
subordinate position in relation to the center.
The 1990 Act relied upon the voluntary cooperation of the local governments to resolve problems of
coordination.  While  local  governments  did  form some associations,  their  interests  in  autonomy
mitigated against a voluntary solution. The amendment of the Local Government Act in 1994 did
attempt to solve some of the institutional problems. In the debate between the capital  government
and the  districts,  by centralizing decision-making within  Budapest  the  law gave priority to  the
capital,  which  happened  to  be  of  the  same  political  color  (liberals  and  socialists)  as  the
parliamentary  majority.  Still,  the  district  governments  did  make  skillful  use  of  their  few
competences in order to effectively blackmail the capital. The dispute remains unsettled.
The redrawing of the boundaries of the Budapest Metropolitan Area had long been on the agenda of
urban development professionals but it was not until 1996 that the earlier boundaries were modified.
The redrawing incorporated 78 communities into the Budapest Metropolitan Area, and, in 2003, 17
of  these  communities  had  city status.  The  change ultimately became necessary because  of  the
shrinking of the Budapest labor market  and the consequent diminishing of commuter traffic. In
addition,  there  was  the  evolution  of  a  new  system  of  relationships,  with  higher  degrees  of
cooperation between suburban production units, modernization of the suburban infrastructure, an
expanding circle  of  services  available  in  suburbs  and an intensifying process  of  economic  and
residential  suburbanization.  Simultaneously,  phenomena  such  as  intensive  land-use,  blurring  of
boundaries between communities, the decline of the natural environment and certain segregation
patterns have also become apparent in the Budapest Metropolitan Area.
The Development Act in 1996 led to the most promising change in the metropolitan governance of
Budapest.  The  Budapest  Suburban  Development  Council  (Budapesti  Agglomeráció  Fejlesztési
Tanács - BAFT) was established in 1997. That was the first institutional framework to include all
stakeholders: the central and capital governments, districts, suburban municipalities, and chambers.
Despite this, the experiment largely failed. The ministries were over represented, the relationship
between Pest  County and the BAFT was undefined, and, most importantly, the Council did not
receive any serious funding and the body became insignificant. Its most important competence was
the  right  to  express opinions on development  plans,  but  this  opinion was not  compulsory. The
Council  produced  many  conceptions,  schemes,  and  recommendations,  although  on  the  whole
without much effect.  In 2000, it was abolished and its functions transferred to the development
council of the Central Hungary Region. The region includes Budapest and Pest County, but not the
suburbs belonging to other counties. The region is a statistical one, so it has no administration and
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no elected bodies. The regional development council does distributes real funds, but lacks a strong
metropolitan perspective.
As a result of these changes, several main problems persist:
1. There are three systems of mass transportation which overlap each other. A monthly pass for
Budapest  transportation,  for example, is not valid for trains and coaches. Moreover, commuters
cannot buy passes covering both Budapest and the suburbs. The parallel infrastructure is costly and
this  is especially so for people living around the city. The Budapest  Transportation Association
(BKSZ) has been planning for more than a decade, while the actual government announces a new
implementation scheme almost every year. Despite this no steps forward, not even little ones, have
been made since the beginning of the 1990s.
2. Municipalities share certain communal services which they cannot operate without a coordinating
institution. Communities that sharing infrastructure systems are often at odds over how much each
of  them  should  contribute  to  the  development,  maintenance  and  operation  of  these  systems.
Moreover,  fragmented  municipalities  have  mush  less  bargaining  power  against  the  privatized
electricity and gas companies, which cover the territory of Budapest and its environs.
3. As the first part of the paper outlined, many people within Budapest have been migrating to the
suburbs where new residential  zones have replaced green areas (including many forests).  Since
1990,  2000  hectares  of  green  surface  have  disappeared  around  Budapest.  All  municipalities,
including  Budapest,  have  an  interest  in  converting  agricultural  territories  into  building  plots.
Collectively, however, all would benefit from regulations that could slow down the loss of the green
areas.
4. Suburban people use educational and health institutions of Budapest, but pay taxes in their home
municipality. The capital as well as districts often raises this issue, but they cannot force the suburbs
to contribute. The usual counter-argument of suburban leaders is that commuters go not only to
hospitals and high schools, but also to shops, and they pay business taxes to the municipality of
Budapest. A mutually satisfactory solution will not be reached without an institution that covers
both Budapest and the suburbs.
In sum, several attempts have been made to resolve the challenge of metropolitan governance, but
so far without much success. As a result, the metropolitan problems persist.
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5. Political Patterns
As  far  as  electoral  patterns  are  concerned,  the  true  dividing  line  lies  not  between  the  city of
Budapest and its suburbs but between the Buda and Pest sides of the Danube. 
In the first round of the parliamentary elections, voter turnout in the suburbs generally followed the
national pattern. By contrast, in all three election years there was a voter turnout in Budapest that
was well above the national and, of course,  the suburban average. In 1994, 73.4% of Budapest
residents cast their ballots, 6% more than people in the suburbs (67.5%). The difference recorded in
the 1998 elections was the same (63.1% and 57.5%) while by 2002, this  difference diminished
slightly (76.6% and 73.1%). In the suburban area, the Western and Northwestern sectors on the
Buda side – where other development indicators are also significant – produced a higher turnout
than the rest of the suburbs in all three elections. Likewise, in Budapest, areas west of the Danube
(the Buda side) produced higher turnouts.6 In all three elections, the North Buda area produced the
highest and the Inner Pest area the lowest voter turnout in Budapest.
An examination of election results (voting patterns) highlights the regional differences within the
Budapest Metropolitan Area.
As for the parliamentary elections in Hungary, the most important temporal change is that by 2002,
an essentially bipolar party system had evolved which resulted in a great concentration of votes on
the right (Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Association) and the left (Hungarian Socialist Party, the former
Communist party). In the suburban communities, Fidesz only gained an average of 7% of votes in
1994, rising to 28% in 1998 and 41% in 2002. While 27% of Budapest voters cast their ballots for
Fidesz in 1998, this rate only went up to 31% in 2002, 10% less than the size of the Fidesz vote in
the suburbs.
The party on the other end of the spectrum, the left-wing Socialists gained 5-6% more votes in
Budapest than in the suburbs in all of the three election years. In the suburbs the Socialists recorded
28%, 28% and 38% of the votes respectively while in Budapest the corresponding figure was 35%,
33% and 43%. At the same time, if we look at the different areas of Budapest separately, it becomes
apparent that in the two Buda areas, Fidesz have done much better than its Budapest average. In
these areas, the other right-wing party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) also did well with
respect  to  other  Budapest  areas.  At  the  same  time,  the  Socialist  Party  secured  a  much  lower
percentage of the vote in these areas than in other Budapest districts in all elections. The Socialists
did  best  in  the  Outer  Pest  region  which  appears  to  be  the  most  left-leaning area  in  all  of  the
Budapest Metropolitan Area. Here, they secured 40% of the vote in 1994, 36% in 1998 and 44% in
2002. As for the suburban areas, the Socialist were mostly supported in those sectors which were
adjacent  to  the Outer Pest  region,  i.e.  the Southern and Southeastern sectors, while Fidesz was
dominant in the Northwestern suburban areas, adjacent to the North Buda area of Budapest.
We must point out that Fidesz did not receive the kind of support in the Buda districts as it did in
the Buda sectors of the suburban areas. One of the reasons for this is that in the Buda districts of
Budapest, the liberals (Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) and the far-right (Hungarian Life and
Justice Party, MIÉP) exhibit similar support patterns, receiving more votes on the Buda than on the
Pest  side.  Both  these  parties  have  a  stronger  voter  base  in  the  city  than  in  the  suburbs.  Not
surprisingly, the agrarian party (the now extinct Independent Smallholders Party, FKGP) did better
in those suburbs with strong ties to agriculture, securing twice the number of votes there than in the
city. By 2002, FKGP had become utterly insignificant in all areas.
In the Budapest Metropolitan Area then, the principal dividing line for the large political parties is
6  When examining electoral patters, we divided Budapest up into four areas: 1. North Buda (Districts 1, 2, 12) 2.
South Buda (11, 22) 3. Inner Pest (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) and 4. Outer Pest (4, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23).
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the Danube. West of the river, both in the city and in the suburbs, the conservatives (and liberals)
are the better supported side while to the east of the river, in Pest and in the adjacent suburbs, the
Socialists are the main political party of choice. The liberals and the far-right, which constitute a
special political subculture, do better in Budapest than in the suburbs.
One can find some interesting patterns concerning the local elections. Voter turnout at municipal
elections grew between the 1998 and 2002 elections in the suburban communities. While in 1998,
an average of 48.4% of eligible voters cast their ballots, in 2002, 52.37% turned up at the voting
booths.  These rates are somewhat higher than the national average. Voter turnout rates actually
decreased in a quarter of the municipalities and increased in three-quarters. In those municipalities
where voter turnout increased, the rate of increase was 7% though the base rate (initial condition)
was 45%. In 1998 those municipalities that exhibited decreasing tendencies had a voter turnout rate
above the national average (56%). Thus, the changes really amount to a leveling of differences.
Above-average voter turnout increases were recorded in the Eastern and Southern sectors of the
metropolitan area. Cities exhibited a rate increase that was twice that of the villages. In the fast-
growing municipalities7, voter turnout was several percentage points above the suburban average
both in 1998 and in 2002 while the growth rate in these suburbs was only average.
We tried to find out whether the political races in the municipal elections had intensified in the
suburbs by examining the number of candidates for the representative (council) and the mayoral
seats. In 1998 an average of three candidates contended one seat and this remained largely the same
in 2002 (2.95 and 3.03). At the same time, in 55% of the communities races did seem to intensify. It
is interesting to see which municipalities had the most intense races and, out of these, to see which
of them saw the greatest degree of intensification. In both 1998 and 1998, the races were twice as
intense in the cities as in the villages. At the same time, the cities exhibited a decreasing number of
candidates per seat while by 2002 in the villages there was an average of 0.24 more candidates for
each seat, in other words there was one more candidate for every four seats. The cities however, did
exhibit  a decreasing tendency which outstripped the increase in villages: in 1998 there were 4.5
candidates per seat and in 2002, only 4.1. Two-thirds of the villages can be said to have had a wider
election contest in 2002 while this is true for 25% of the cities. Of course, the growing number of
candidates might have something to do with the population growth: in fast-growing municipalities,
the race intensified by 0.25 candidate, while other suburban communities recorded no change in
intensity.  At  the  same  time,  the  fast-growing  communities  in  2002  were  still  behind  other
municipalities  with respect  to the number of candidates,  2.74 and 3.18 per seat  respectively. It
would appear that the status and particular features of the municipality has more to do with the
changes in the intensity of political races. In the case of villages experiencing an average or slower
growth, we witnessed an intensifying pattern but cities in the same category recorded a significantly
higher rate of intensification.  This growth can be observed in both fast-growing cities and fast-
growing villages.
The examination of changes in the number of candidates for mayoral seats yields similar results.
The average number of candidates grew slightly between 1998 and 2002, but the growth rate is less
than impressive (0.11). The average number of candidates remained unchanged in the cities but
increased in villages, where there were 0.2 more candidates in 2002 than in 1998 per race on the
average. At the same time, the average number of candidates was less in the villages than in cities.
In 2002 there were 3.25 candidates in mayoral races in villages while in the cities this figure was
3.94. Though the difference is still striking, it has been diminishing since 1998 when cities had one
more  candidate  per  race  than  the  villages.  In  municipalities  with  an  above-average  population
growth rate, there were 0.5 more candidates per seat in 2002 than in 1998, which is a significant
7 We looked at 27 suburbs separately – these communities between 1990 and 2001 exhibited a population growth rate
higher than the average of 25%. These 27 suburbs were included in our „fast-growing community” category. 89% of
the fast-growing communities have a status of municipality and there are only 3 cities among them.
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growth rate  by any calculation.  Similarly, slower-growing municipalities  exhibited  a  decreasing
intensity  in  mayoral  races.  Again,  we  come  up  against  the  question  whether  this  interesting
observation  could  not  be  explained by the  make-up effect,  that  is,  by the  fact  that  the  village
category always had a higher rate of municipalities with higher population growth rates. It seems
however, that this could not be the reason. In both cities and in villages where we found an above-
average population growth rate, we also recorded an increase in intensity in elections.
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6. Suburbanization and Socio-Political Tensions Within Suburbs
Suburbanization has resulted in a significant reshaping of a good number of municipalities in the
Budapest Metropolitan Area. This section examines the changes in the political life of the suburban
communities  wrought  by  the  rapid  and  voluminous  population  influx  from  Budapest.  Our
observations are based on three qualitative case studies – Diósd, Veresegyház, Pomáz – therefore
our primary objective is to highlight certain phenomena and effect mechanisms rather than measure
their scope and extent.
To summarize our research, we can conclude that the population explosion throughout the 1990s in
the suburban communities in the Budapest Metropolitan Area created conflicts. These were not so
much between the immigrant and resident populations but between the municipal authorities and
certain groups of the population. One problem area common to all the municipalities in our analysis
was  the  struggle  to  diminish  the  “infrastructure  deficit”  that  emerged  between  the  growing
population and the infrastructure needed to sustain them. As we have indicated earlier in this study,
the municipal authorities have had to deal with a “terrible legacy” from the previous regime. This,
of course, is true for other parts of the country, but in the communities of the Budapest Metropolitan
Area, because of the high growth rate of the population the demands for infrastructure development
are more intense and pressing. Needless to say, different authorities have different means at their
disposal  to  manage  this  process.  From  this  perspective,  the  starting  point  i.e.  municipal
infrastructure, real estate market and general economic conditions, does play especial significance.
In the following section, we will highlight the main conflicts and their manifestations in the political
life of these communities.
Physical Infrastructure
Infrastructure  represents  a  key  problem  area.  Many  areas  without  the  necessary  infrastructure
become overloaded and the local authorities cannot develop at the same pace that people move in to
the area. The situation is exacerbated by construction or additions that take place without permits, as
well  as by the slow, “informal”  transition  of resort  areas into inadequately regulated residential
areas. Diósd and Pomáz are both good examples of this tendency. The municipal government of
Diósd  re-zoned  the  extensive  resort  areas  of  the  municipality  into  residential  areas  last  year.
Because the resort zones were already in a more advanced initial condition in comparison to other,
similar  areas  in  the  region,  lacking  only  a  sewer  system  but  possessing  all  other  forms  of
infrastructure, the area was already populated mainly by permanent residents. Some still maintained
a Budapest  apartment,  some moved here in the hope of cheaper living costs.  As the municipal
government could only apply for state development funds for residential areas and because it could
not possibly build roads, sewer systems etc. from its own resources, it decided to rezone the area.
Simultaneously, the residents themselves placed some pressure on the government. They benefited
from the rezoning in various ways, for instance,  only property in residential  areas can serve as
collateral  to  loans.  The  rezoning  did  not  benefit  the  municipal  government  financially,  but  it
certainly did the property owners of the rezoned area, whose plots went up in price.
Social Infrastructure
The rapid population growth placed a great strain on social infrastructure, such as the congestion of
nursery schools and kindergartens. In 1990, in the suburban cities, there were 122 children for 100
nursery school places, in towns and villages the equivalent figure was 130. In the same year, there
were 115 children for every 100 kindergarten places. Needless to say, that these problems have
intensified with the growing population influx. In Veresegyház, for instance, a new 24-room school
was recently completed, but it is already clear that its capacity will be exhausted in the near future
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and another school will have to be built. Nor is the “doctor density” in health care as it should be --
the physician-per-resident rates in suburban communities lag behind the national average. At the
end of 1998, for every 10,000 residents, there were 20 physicians in the suburbs of the Budapest
Metropolitan Area, 66 in Budapest while the national average was 36.
Budget Challenges
While tax revenues are rise significantly, in most communities, these resources do not cover the
skyrocketing costs  of education,  infrastructure  development  and social  services.  When planning
their long-term objectives, municipal governments were depending on revenues from local personal
income tax. In the early 1990s, 100% of the personal income tax went to local governments, this
first dropped to 50% and currently, only 10% of income tax revenues go to local governments. With
the drying up of central, redistributed sources, local governments have had to find alternative means
to finance public tasks out of their own sources. However, even communities with strong economic
backgrounds have difficulties dealing with their infrastructure deficit. Budget deficits are plugged
by rezoning and selling more and more land. This is a vicious circle8 which reproduces the deficit in
infrastructure. Different local governments have varying means to break out from this vicious circle.
These are usually determined by their initial conditions and the growth rate of their municipalities.
Some local governments scope for action depends on whether they have privately owned lots or
revenues from other sources9.
The other obvious strategy to raise revenue is to increase the industrial zone, in other words, to
attract business into the locality. As we have already seen, there are great differences in this respect
between the sectors within the suburban area. The main business incentive tool in the hand of local
governments is the granting of municipal tax breaks. At the same time, industrial projects may come
up  against  resistance  from  residents  and  often  it  is  difficult  to  find  any solution  that  is  both
environmentally and resident friendly. Veresegyház is a good example of this struggle. In the last
decade, the population has practically doubled. As the influx is constant so the local government
tries to keep up by attracting industry. Recently, a factory manufacturing car batteries tried to move
to the municipality but the resistance and protest of the residents thwarted the project.
Difficulties of Land Use Planning
One of the primary preconditions which made large-scale settlement possible was the privatization
processes  of  the  1990s.  This  saw  many  old-time  residents  regain  their  property  which  was
nationalized  under  the  Communist  regime.  However,  one  of  the  primary  features  of  the  land
privatization in Hungary was that it created a highly fragmented lot structure. New owners received
small and frequently scattered plots. Needless to say, speculators kept a close eye on privatization
deals and bought up many of these lots. As a result, the owners of privatized lands exerted pressure
on the local government to help them capitalize on their property interests (especially if the land
owner also happened to be a local representative) resulting in the rezoning a lot of the land. In many
cases, “exerting pressure” smacked of corruption or bribery. 
It is however, very difficult to create a comprehensive zoning plan for heavily fragmented areas
without injuring the interests of at least some of the owners. As the mayor of Diósd put it, 
8 Local  residents  in  Piliscsaba,  Telki  and  Pomáz  have  already  staged  demonstrations  against  rezoning  and
incorporating new lands into residential areas.
9 The local government of Pilisjászfalu, for instance, is the only player on its real estate market and the community is
not only well-located but it also inherited infrastructure from the previous regime with which it is now able to attract
companies to open facilities there. (Váradi 1999) The local leadership envisioned a slow, long-term growth, tightly
controlled by the local government, which would see infrastructural development followed by subdivision and sale
of lots with the provision to develop.
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“These plots were not originally formed to be residential plots but were divided for
agricultural production, narrow strips of land from 6 m to 12-20 m wide. These lots
had  to  be  merged  but  people  had  a  hard  time  coming  to  agreements  with  their
neighbors, let alone with anybody else and these difficulties slowed down the process
of settlement.”
In many cases, when it clashed with the interests of some owners, the construction of a road that
was  wide  enough  proved  to  be  a  problem.  Infrastructure  developments  also  ran  into  similar
difficulties.
Wherever municipal governments were less influential players on the real estate market, their scope
for action in regulating and controlling settlement also suffered. In Diósd, most of the land is in
private hands. The municipal government does not subdivide its own lots, yet the rate of influx is
one of the highest in the Budapest Metropolitan Area. At the other extreme, we have the case of
Veresegyház, where the municipal government is the only player on the real estate market. During
privatization, the municipal government bought from all local residents albeit entering into a debt
spiral as a consequence. It used the lots as collateral in order to take out mortgage loans. In turn,
they could only pay these loans back by selling off the lots to people moving into the municipality.
This amplified the rate of settlement. At the same time, this local government is in the fortunate
position of being able to stop subdivision whenever it wants to, yet if it did chose to go down this
route  it  would  have  to  find  substitute  sources  for  financing  the  infrastructure  developments
demanded by the new settlers. Thus, from the perspective of local government’s room to maneuver
it is very important what alternative sources of income it possesses.10
Social Segregation
The influx of a population into a non-residential  or infrastructurally underdeveloped areas often
goes hand-in-hand with social segregation. This is what happened in Pomáz: the resort area, though
lacking infrastructure, is situated in a pleasant, forest environment and many people moved there in
the  hope of  lower living costs.  Today, the municipal  government  has  to  tackle  the  problem of
cottages and shacks constructed without permits which gradually become residential dwellings and
constitute  a drain  on social  policy funds.  Usually, it  is  lower-income people who move to  the
underdeveloped areas, but once they are there, the local government must look after them. Further
conflicts  arise  when  people  of  extremely  different  financial  background  become  neighbors  –
especially in situations when all neighborhood residents need to come up with their own share to
contribute to infrastructure development.
Social Integration of Newcomers
The social integration of newcomers constitutes a difficult task in certain communities and severely
taxes  the  resources  of  the  local  government  that  has  to  organize  community  events,  cultural
programs, support civic activities and set up the institutions necessary to administer these. Social
integration proved less difficult in communities where waves of new settlements took place before
the change of regime, in other words where some of the newcomers have been residing in the
locality for decades and where some of the population was employed in industry, as in Diósd for
example.  Communities  that  were  dominated  by  agrarian  populations  exhibit  clashes  of  very
different mentalities. Long-time residents of what became suburbs are usually suspicious and wary
of people migrating into the communities especially as the newcomers tend to quickly become the
10 The local government of Pilisjászfalu, for instance, is the only player on its real estate market and the community is
not only well-located but it also inherited infrastructure from the previous regime with which it is now able to attract
companies to open facilities there. (Váradi 1999) The local leadership envisioned a slow, long-term growth, tightly
controlled by the local government, which would see infrastructural development followed by subdivision and sale
of lots with the provision to develop.
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dominant group in local politics.
Conflicts  arise  not  so  much between the newcomer and the  long-time resident  populations  but
between the municipal authorities and certain segments of the population with diverging interests.
For instance, a source of conflict can be where a road is to be built. „If they pave one road, others
elsewhere will start complaining and even offer money for the same work in their area but the local
government must come up with its own share of the costs,” said a Diósd journalist. Another source
of civic discontent is the growing volume of traffic – in Pomáz and Diósd, among the locations in
our case study – but this kind of conflict is geographically determined. In other words, people living
in the same neighborhood will protest regardless of whether they are new or long-time residents.
Many of the communities have civic associations that preserve local traditions and respondents in
our survey revealed that events and meetings of these are attended by newcomers as well as long-
time residents.
Protest Against Municipality Growth
Ironically, the great influx of population destroys the very value that motivates many to move into
the suburbs (peace and quiet). Increased volume of population results in an increased volume of
traffic  in  communities  and  the  mushrooming  construction  sites  can  also  constitute  a  source  of
inconvenience. There are many problems which plague everyday life due to such phenomena as
traffic jams,  the underdeveloped nature of public transport  systems and so on.  In many places,
commuting has become practically impossible. This is why newcomers, once settled, turn against
further  settlement  and thus  become ranged against  not  only the  local  government  which needs
revenues but also against long-time residents who still possess land to sell to newcomers. There is
always a great pressure on the local governments to rezone private lands, thereby increasing their
value.  This  pressure  is  even  greater  if  the  lands  in  question  belong to  local  representatives  or
officials.  In an  indirect  way, local  residents,  especially those  in  the  construction business,  also
benefit from growth. Permitting further growth in these communities has become one of the most
important issues that is debated.
The Representation of Newcomers
As for the specifics of political life, our case studies have shown that bodies of representatives did
undergo  changes  under  the  influence  of  the  newcomer  population.  On  the  one  hand,  political
candidates might emerge from the ranks of the newcomers and on the other, newcomers might vote
in local elections according to party sympathies, not knowing the candidates personally. In Diósd,
the  population  increase  brought  party politics  into  the  municipality.  Before  the  2002 elections,
people voted not so much along party lines but along personal preference for the candidate. Long-
time community leaders hope that the party sympathies of the newcomers will only last until the
first election after which they will get to know the candidates and local conditions better and will
cast their vote on the basis of performance rather than party colors.
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7. Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to report the socio-economic and political development of the Budapest
Metropolitan Area. Its main findings are as follows:
1. The suburbanization process started in the 1960s and gained momentum in the 1990s, when the
population  of  the  suburban  area  grew by 20  percent.  Suburban  municipalities  established  new
residential areas and significantly decreased the extent of green surfaces around Budapest.
2.  The  establishment  of  autonomous  and  democratic  local  governments  created  a  favorable
environment  for  the  development  of  the  suburbs,  something  which  had  been  disliked  by  the
Communist  planning agencies.  The  infrastructure has  improved and is  doing so quickly in  the
suburban area. Still, the development is not fast enough in many places, finding it difficult to keep
pace with the growth of the population. This led to protest against further growth in most suburbs,
though in varying intensity.
3. Since the beginning of the 1970s, several attempts have been made to create an institution of
metropolitan  governance,  but  these  attempts  have  more  or  less  failed.  As  a  consequence,  the
problems of mass transportation, land use, shared communal services and educational and health
institutions remain unresolved.
4. Concerning political parties, the dividing line is primarily between the Buda side, where the right
is more supported, and the Pest side of the metropolitan area, where the socialists (ex-Communists)
are  stronger.  As  far  as  electoral  patterns  are  concerned,  the  border  between  Budapest  and  the
suburban area, which is so important administratively, is less important.
5. The integration of newcomers in suburbs is surprisingly smooth. The main conflict is between
local government and those who ask for better infrastructure and slower growth.
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